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RUNNING HEAD: Ironic effects of self-control 
 
 
Exploring the Interplay of Trait Self-Control and Ego Depletion: Empirical Evidence for 
Ironic Effects 
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Abstract 
Trait self-control (TSC) has been conceptualized as a general and abstract ability to exert self-
regulation across multiple domains that has mostly beneficial effects. However, its 
relationship to situational depletion of self-regulatory resources has received little attention. 
We systematically explore the interplay of trait and situational self-control in two studies 
(total N = 264). In contrast with a positive view of TSC, the results show greater ego 
depletion effects for high (vs. low) self-control abilities across such diverse domains as candy 
consumption (Study 1), risk-taking behavior (Study 2), and achievement motivation (Study 
2). It is proposed that these ironic effects are attributable to high-TSC individuals’ less 
frequent active inhibiton of impulses in everday life and their resulting lack of experience in 
resisting acute temptations. A third study (N = 358) corroborated this general reasoning by 
showing that TSC is indeed associated with less frequent impulse inhibition in daily routines. 
Our data point to a downside of dispositional self-control in ego depletion paradigms. Other 
explanations and potential future avenues for resolving inconsistent findings across the 
literature are discussed. 
176 words 
Keywords: trait self-control, ego depletion, self-regulation, ironic effects, restrained eating 
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People exert self-control on a daily base. Short-term temptations (e.g., high-calorie 
food, risky sexual behavior, or avoidance of taxing activities like studying or physical 
exercise) have to be overcome for the sake of long-term goals (e.g., good health, academic 
achievement). A large body of literature has focused on individual differences in how good 
people are in deferring short-term temptation for their long-term goals. In addition, a more 
recent approach to self-control has pointed to the finiteness of self-regulatory resources. 
Immediately after engaging in effortful self-control, individuals experience ego depletion and 
are less likely to effectively exert self-control. The present paper seeks to bring together these 
two previously disparate research traditions on self-control: a dispositional trait perspective 
with more recent research on situational depletion of self-regulatory resources. We report 
unexpected findings in support of an ironic effect of greater situational depletion for 
participants who describe themselves as high in trait self-control (TSC).  
Trait Self-Control 
Most working definitions of self-control encompass regulating thoughts, emotions, 
impulses, and performance as operationalizations of self-control behavior (e.g., Baumeister, 
Heatherton, & Tice, 1994). In general, the ability to control oneself is regarded as a relatively 
stable individual difference variable that plays a pivotal role for a wide range of positive 
outcomes in people’s lives, like high level of achievement and performance, impulse control, 
healthy adjustment, and satisfactory interpersonal relationships (Tangney, Baumeister, & 
Boone, 2004). In summary, TSC is commonly understood as the ability to exert habitual 
inhibition of undesired habits or impulses (e.g., procrastination, impulsive eating or drinking, 
socially inappropriate or risky behaviors) and direct one’s own behavior towards the 
achievement of desired (mostly long-term) goals (e.g., academic achievement, interpersonal 
adjustment, personal health).  
Ego Depletion 
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In addition to the trait perspective on self-control, it has been emphasized that the ability 
to control oneself is a limited resource, resulting in depletion after exerting self-control. 
Baumeister, Bratslavsky, Muraven, and Tice (1998) coined the term ego depletion (ED) for 
the effect of showing less self-control on a subsequent task when an earlier task demanded 
self-control (i.e., dual-task paradigm). ED effects have been found in such diverse domains as 
physical endurance, persistence, emotion regulation, performance in logical decision tasks, 
sexual impulses, aggression after being provoked, and several interpersonal processes (for an 
overview see Baumeister, Vohs, & Tice, 2007). A recent meta-analysis has provided an 
extensive overview of ED effects with the finding that average effects range from medium to 
large (average d = .62; Hagger, Wood, Stiff, & Chatzisarantis, 2010). 
The interplay of TSC and ED 
At present it remains both theoretically and empirically unclear how trait and state 
conceptions of self-control should interact. Some authors suggested that participants high in 
TSC should be less vulnerable to ED, potentially because they have more resources at hand 
before reaching a point of depletion (e.g., Dvorak & Simons, 2009). Other authors suggested 
that TSC and ED should function largely independently (e.g., Muraven, Pogarsky, & Shmueli, 
2006). Empirically speaking, the protective account would suggest that TSC moderates ED 
effects. In fact, a (relatively small) number of studies find such a protective effect of ED 
(DeWall, Baumeister, Stillman, & Gailliot, 2007; Dvorak & Simons, 2009; Gailliot, 
Schmeichel, & Baumeister, 2006; Gailliot, Schmeichel, & Maner, 2007). However, all of 
these studies have some limitations in the way TSC is measured, in the operationalization of 
the dependent variable, or the way resource depletion is induced. We will briefly discuss these 
problems to allow a more differentiated weighing of the available evidence in favor of a 
protective account of TSC against ED.  
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For instance, Dvorak and Simons (2009) a priori differentiated two styles of self-
control, which they labeled as good and bad self-control, and found only good self-control 
buffered the effect of ED on task persistence. Good self-control here was defined as high 
scores on subscales that tapped into future time perspective, problem-solving, and cognitive 
effort – all constructs that seem to be more closely related to the dependent variable task 
persistence than to be primary indicators of TSC. In another study, TSC was measured in a 
more straight-forward way (Self-control Scale; Tangney et al., 2004) but the dependent 
variable was rather weak. Instead of looking at actual aggressive behavior, the study solely 
relied on participants’ self-estimated intentions to aggress as the dependent variable (DeWall 
et al., 2007; Exp. 4).  
So far, the most robust evidence for buffering effects of TSC comes from work on 
Terror Management Theory. Results showed that only low-TSC individuals showed increased 
support for US president Bush (Gailliot et al., 2006; Study 5) and general worldview defense 
(Gailliot et al., 2007; Study 2) after thinking about their own death. In a similar vein, a 
previous task to regulate emotions led to an increase in death-related words included in 
participants’ narratives only for low-TSC individuals (Gailliot et al., 2007; Study 1). Although 
these results are interesting, consistent, and telling, it is open to debate whether the underlying 
processes could be easily mapped onto the ED model of situational self-control depletion. For 
one, having thoughts of death or supporting president Bush do not seem to be prime examples 
of impulsive behavior (i.e., self-control failure). Second, building an analogy to the protective 
account of TSC cited above one would need to assume that TSC helps individuals to resist 
exhaustion of their self-regulatory resources and remain self-controlled. However, the 
theoretical rationale of why TSC buffers mortality salience effects is not based on less 
exhaustion due to an equally strong depletion manipulation but rests on the reasoning that 
TSC helps minimize the (depleting) manipulation by facilitating the “suppression of death 
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thoughts” (Gailliot et al., 2007; p. 895). This reasoning deviates from an account based on 
general resistance against resource depletion and the effect may thus be specific to the domain 
of suppressing mortality salience. 
Other works either explicitly do not find the mentioned interaction effect (Gailliot & 
Baumeister, 2007; Stillman, Tice, Fincham, & Lambert, 2009; Study 2) or fail to report a 
corresponding interaction analysis (Freeman & Muraven, 2010; Muraven et al., 2006). In 
summary, the evidence regarding the interplay of TSC and ED has to be regarded as 
inconclusive, leading the authors of a recent meta-analysis to suggest that “future research 
should provide further tests of the interaction between ego depletion and trait self-control on 
task performance using the dual-task paradigm” (Hagger et al., 2010, p. 520).  
The present research 
In the present research, we systematically explored the role of TSC in the dual-task 
paradigm with frequently used ED manipulations (as opposed to the potential special case of 
mortality salience) and behavioral dependent variables (as opposed to self-reported behavioral 
intentions), more specifically eating behavior (Study 1), and risky decisions (Study 2). As an 
additional (weaker) dependent variable we included self-reported achievement motivation 
(Study 2). These domains were chosen because they are distinct domains for which general 
positive effects of TSC have been found (impulse inhibition and achievement; see Tangney et 
al., 2004) and thus allowed testing for the boundary conditions of the presumed effects. For 
each of these dependent variables we predicted a main effect of ED with more candy 
consumption, more risky choices, and less achievement motivation for high- vs. low-ED 
participants. With regard to the moderating role of TSC, we tested whether we could establish 
the buffering effect occasionally found or whether no such effect could be detected. 
Inconsistent with any of our a priori hypotheses, we found an ironic effect on all three 
dependent variables: Particularly those high in TSC were vulnerable to the debilitating effect 
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of the ED manipulation. Seeking to find an explanation for this thought-provoking finding, we 
explored the nature of TSC in everyday temptations in Study 3. The results showed that TSC 
was associated with temptation avoidance — not inhibition — leading us to conclude that the 
central skill to resist temptations seems to be least trained in high-TSC individuals. 
Study 1 
The consumption of unhealthy, high-calorie food (e.g., candy) often serves as a prime 
example of impulsive behavior – and a failure of the self to prevent such sweet surrender 
(e.g., Hofmann, Rauch, & Gawronski, 2007). The conventional wisdom that we are 
particularly likely to grab snacks when our self-regulation is either depleted (e.g., after a long 
day) or distracted (e.g., while watching TV) is corroborated by a plethora of scientific 
findings (e.g., Friese, Hofmann, & Wänke, 2008; Hofmann et al., 2007, Shmueli & 
Prochaska, 2009; Vohs & Heatherton, 2000; Zyphur, Warren, Landis, & Thoresen, 2007). In 
the first study, we sought to replicate previous findings of increased candy consumption after 
ED with two important additions. First, we sought to explore the interplay of TSC and ED in 
this domain. Second, we tested whether a possible moderation by TSC would be incremental 
to the moderating role of an overly controlled style of eating (restrained eating). Previous 
studies have demonstrated that restrained eating exposes individuals to greater danger of food 
consumption, especially after ED (Hofmann et al., 2007; Kahan, Polivy, & Herman, 2003).  
Method 
Participants. University students (N = 137; 28 men, 109 women, mean age = 22.6 
years, SD = 4.7) participated for monetary compensation. Allocation of participants to the 
experimental conditions was independent of age, t(135) = 1.23, p = .22, and sex, χ2 = 1.73, p 
= .19. 
Ego depletion manipulation. To manipulate the level of ED, we used a modified 
Stroop task. All participants had to select a colored key to indicate the color of the text in 
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which color names were presented. In the low-ED condition, the color names were presented 
in lettering of the corresponding color (e.g., “red” appeared in red lettering). In the high-ED 
condition, the meaning of the word never matched the text color, and so the automatic 
response to process the key corresponding to the meaning of the word had to be inhibited. In 
addition, participants were asked to press the key corresponding to the meaning of the word if 
the word was presented in blue lettering (25% of the trials), thus preventing them from 
strategically ignoring the meaning of the words. After completing 12 practice trials, 
participants received feedback regarding their accuracy. If participants answered more than 
25% of the items incorrectly, they had to repeat the practice phase. Participants completed 
180 test trials in both conditions. 
Measured moderators.  
Trait Self-Control (TSC). TSC was assessed with the self-control subscale from the 
German Self-Regulatory Skills Questionnaire (SRSQ; Schmidt & Imhoff, 2011). Higher 
scores on this measure indicate higher TSC. The SRSQ self-control scale is comprised of 10 
items from several well-established measures of self-control including the Self-Control Scale 
(SCS; Tangney et al., 2004). The items were extracted factor-analytically from a large pool of 
items tapping into self-control-related constructs of conscientiousness, impulse control, and 
procrastination that are all also reflected in the SCS. Speaking to the conceptual overlap with 
existing standard TSC scales, three items were taken from the SCS (e.g., “People would say 
that I have iron self-discipline”), four items were taken from the UPPS Impulsive Behavior 
Scale (UPPS; Whiteside & Lynam, 2001; e.g., “I usually think carefully before doing 
anything”), and three items were taken from the short form of the German Volitional 
Components Inventory (VCI-S3; Kuhl & Fuhrmann, 1998; e.g., “If a task needs to be 
completed, I like to tackle it immediately”). The complete wording can be found in the 
appendix. The SRSQ was chosen because at the time of the studies the recently published 
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German language version (Bertrams & Dickhäuser, 2009) of the well-established SCS 
(Tangney et al., 2004) was not available. 
Restrained Eating (RE). A scale for assessing RE was derived from the German 
translation of the five-item Restraint Eating subscale from the Eating Disorders Examination 
Questionnaire (EDE-Q; Fairburn & Beglin, 1994; German version: Hilbert & Tuschen-
Caffier, 2006) to assess habitual RE practices over a long period of time. On a seven-point 
scale (1 = “never”, 7 = “all the time”), participants indicated how often within the last five 
years they had tried to reduce their caloric intake, eaten nothing for a long time, banned 
certain products from their diet, made diet rules, and tried to keep an empty stomach in order 
to modify their weight or figure. 
Dependent variable. In an ostensible product test, a bowl containing the contents of a 
125g peanut m&m
®
’s package was placed in front of each participant. Five minutes were 
given to taste the product and to rate it on a variety of dimensions such as naturalness, 
sweetness, and package design. After time had expired, the candy was taken away. Candy 
consumption was later determined by weighing the amount left and subtracting it from 
preconsumption weight. 
Procedure. Participants arrived either alone or in groups of up to five, were greeted by 
an experimenter, and were seated in separate cubicles. Participants first filled in the TSC and 
RE measures. Then, participants completed the Stroop task that included the ED manipulation 
and, after a short filler task, engaged in the product test. At the end of the experiment, 
participants were asked their height and weight, and how hungry they felt before they entered 
the experiment to control for pre-existing differences between the two ED conditions. At the 
end, participants were fully debriefed and thanked. 
Results 
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Preliminary analyses. The two experimental conditions did not differ with regard to 
their reported feelings of hunger before the experiment, nor on the two moderator variables, F 
< 1. Importantly, feelings of hunger before the experiment were unrelated to TSC and RE, |r| 
< .06, p > .55. Height and weight information was used to calculate the body mass index for 
each participant, which also did not differ between conditions, p = .28, and was unrelated to 
RE and TSC, |r| < .03, p > .80. All continuous variables were screened for univariate outliers 
(|SD| > 3). One participant’s candy consumption in the high-ED condition was more than 
three SD above the overall mean. All analyses reported below were conducted both with and 
without this participant. However, because results did not differ, the analyses reported below 
are based on the full sample. 
Main analyses. As predicted, participants in the high-ED condition consumed more 
candy, M = 21.63 grams, SD = 3.42, than participants in the low-ED condition, M = 19.49 
grams, SD = 2.68, t(126.81) = 4.07, p < .001, d = 0.72. RE and TSC were moderately 
correlated across the whole sample and both TSC and RE were positively related to greater 
candy consumption (Table 1). 
We conducted multiple regression analyses to test the moderation of the ED effect. To 
test the predicted moderation by RE, we conducted a hierarchical multiple regression analysis 
(Cohen, Cohen, West, & Aiken, 2003). Regressing the amount of consumed candy on the 
effect-coded ED manipulation (-1 for low ED, +1 for high ED) and the standardized RE scale 
resulted in a significant outcome, R2 = .15, F(2, 133) = 12.09, p < .001. Adding the cross-
product of these two predictors significantly increased the amount of variance explained, ∆R2 
= .06, p < 001. Results showed that, in addition to the main effects of the experimental 
manipulation, ß = .34, p < .001, and RE, ß = .19, p < .01, the interaction term also reached 
significance, ß = .25, p < .001. Thus, RE moderated the ED effect on candy consumption in a 
positive direction.  That is, for participants with a higher score on RE (+1 SD), the ED effect 
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simple slope was large and significant, b = 1.92, SE = 0.35, p < .001. The slope for 
participants low in RE (-1 SD) did not significantly differ from zero, b = 0.26, SE = 0.35, p 
=.45. Hence, only participants who reported habitual restrained eating practices over the last 
five years consumed more chocolate after completing a highly ego depleting task (vs. low-
ED). 
The same procedure was then employed with TSC (instead of RE) as a moderator. 
Paralleling the results for RE, ED and TSC conjointly predicted a significant amount of 
variance in the criterion, R2 = .30, F(2, 134) = 29.49, p < .001. Again, adding the interaction 
term significantly increased the explained variance, ∆R2 = .07, p < .001. Thus, the main 
effects of ED, ß = .32, p < .001, and TSC, ß = .44, p < .001, were qualified by a significant 
interaction, ß = .26, p < .001. Contrary to the assumption of a protective effect of TSC, a 
general disposition to control one’s impulses led to greater vulnerability to the effect of an ED 
manipulation on the consumption of tempting food, b = 1.87, SE = 0.31, p < .001 (simple 
slope test at +1 SD). In contrast, participants low in TSC (-1 SD) showed virtually no ED 
effect, b = 0.18, SE = 0.31, p = .57. Participants who self-reported highly self-controlled 
behavior were observed to consume more candy following an ego depleting manipulation (vs. 
low-ED). 
RE and TSC were moderately correlated, and so the parallel results could have been due 
to the shared variance of the two moderators. To estimate each moderator’s unique effect, we 
entered the experimental manipulation, TSC, RE, and all their cross products including the 
three-way interaction simultaneously into a multiple regression to predict candy consumption. 
Whereas the main effects of the experimental condition, ß = .31, p < .001, and TSC, ß = .40, p 
< .001, remained stable, RE no longer had a main effect, ß = .07, p > .30. More importantly, 
both two-way interactions remained significant, not qualified by the three-way interaction, ß = 
.05, p > .52. The ED effect was thus independently moderated by TSC, ß = .19, p = .01, and 
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RE, ß = .18, p = .01. Figures 1 and 2 show the plotted means for both two-way interactions (at 
± 1 SD) based on the regression coefficients in this last regression equation. 
Discussion 
Candy is a high-calorie food that is generally desired, but that is avoided (for health and 
weight concerns) through successful self-regulation efforts. In this study, we replicated the 
effect that ED leads to increased candy consumption. We also replicated the finding that – 
ironically – those individuals who try hardest to inhibit the impulse to eat high-calorie foods 
(restrained eaters) are most vulnerable to the ED effect. Controlling for body mass index and 
pre-experimental feelings of hunger did not alter the results. Adding to this, the same was true 
for dispositional TSC. Participants who described themselves as highly self-controlled 
showed an increase in chocolate consumption after the high-ED task. We also looked at the 
relationship between the two moderators (RE and TSC). Some might argue that TSC could be 
the more distal personality variable of the more proximal RE and thus basically tap into the 
same variance. However, our data suggest otherwise: The moderation effects were 
independent from each other, thus having unique and incremental validity. Another 
noteworthy result is the positive zero-order correlation of TSC and candy consumption that 
might raise doubt about the validity of the TSC measurement. It is thus important to realize 
that the reported correlations are calculated across both ED conditions and will thus be largely 
driven by the positive ironic effect under high-ED. Control analyses revealed that there is no 
significant correlation between TSC and candy consumption under low ED. 
This ironic effect of TSC is at odds with the view of TSC as a protective factor that 
would ultimately lead to more self-controlled behavior. However, it may be that candy 
consumption is a special case in this regard. There exists the view that the physiological base 
of ED is glucose consumption (Gailliot & Baumeister, 2007; but see Kurzban, 2010). It has 
been claimed that self-control depletes relatively large amounts of blood glucose (Gailliot & 
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Baumeister, 2007) and that one single act of self-control is sufficient for glucose to drop 
below optimal levels (Gailliot, Baumeister, et al., 2007). It might thus be argued that glucose 
intake after ED is highly functional to optimize self-regulation in one’s everyday life after the 
lab session. In that sense, the enhanced sugar intake after ED could be interpreted as a rational 
strategy intended to optimize blood glucose levels rather than as a failure of self-control. We 
thus sought to expand the findings to other dependent variables to de-confound self-control 
failure from functional recovery of self-regulatory resources. 
Study 2 
We conducted a second study with a different ED manipulation and, more importantly, 
with two conceptually different dependent variables: risky behavior and achievement 
motivation. Recent research suggests that ego depleted individuals are willing to take more 
risk than non-depleted individuals. After typical ED manipulations, participants bought more 
lottery tickets (Bruyneel, Dewitte, Franses, & Dekimpe, 2009), opted for more risky options 
in hypothetical situations (Freeman & Muraven, 2010), and risked more “pumps” in the 
Balloon Analogue Risk Task (BART; Freeman & Muraven, 2010; for the BART, see Lejuez 
et al., 2002). If self-control resources are depleted, people will make riskier but ultimately 
more costly decisions. We tested whether TSC moderated this effect – and if so, in which 
direction. 
As a second dependent variable, we used a measure of achievement motivation. 
Achievement and performance constitute a classical domain of self-controlled behavior 
(Tangney et al., 2004). In fact, typical items tapping into self-control include behavioral 
descriptions like working effectively and being self-disciplined or procrastinating (for 
reverse-coded items). Several studies have demonstrated that ED manipulations lead to a 
decrease in task persistence (e.g., Price & Yates, 2010; Vohs et al., 2008; Zyphur et al., 2007) 
as well as reduced performance on several cognitive tasks (for an overview see Hagger et al., 
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2010). Importantly, both of these variables share a common motivational antecedent. Task 
persistence is closely related to individuals’ motivation to excel, commonly labelled 
achievement motivation (e.g., Brunstein & Maier, 2005; Cooper, 1983). Similarly, 
achievement motivation has also been shown to directly predict success or task performance 
(e.g., Cooper, 1983; Karabenick & Youssef, 1968). We theorized that achievement 
motivation, task persistence, and task performance represent sequential stages of 
performance-related behavior (cf., the Rubicon model of action phases; Achtziger & 
Gollwitzer, 2008; Heckhausen, 1991). Thus, following from the robust effect of ED on both 
task persistence and performance, self-regulation failure might already become visible at an 
earlier stage of performance-related behavior: the motivation to excel. This notion is 
corroborated by a recent finding that ego depleted students self-selected easier tasks than non-
depleted students, thus exhibiting a lower achievement motivation (Price & Yates, 2010). We 
expected achievement motivation to be lower after ED, and explored whether this effect was 
contingent on TSC. 
Method 
Participants. One hundred twenty-seven students (92 women, 35 men) participated in 
this study in exchange for monetary compensation. Their average age was 21.8 years (SD = 
2.6). Allocation of participants to the experimental conditions was independent of age, t(125) 
= 1.313, p = .19, and sex, χ2 < 1. 
Ego depletion manipulation. We used a working memory capacity task (e.g., Park, 
Glaser, & Knowles, 2008; Schmeichel, 2007, Study 3; Wright et al., 2007, Studies 1 and 2) to 
induce ED. Recent research has suggested that working memory capacity plays a role in self-
control tasks like the inhibition of prepotent automatic behavioral tendencies and the shielding 
of explicitly endorsed attitudes (Hofmann, Gschwender, Friese, Wiers, & Schmitt, 2008) as 
well as emotion suppression (Schmeichel, Volokhov, & Demaree, 2008). We built on the idea 
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that working memory is more than just a passive memory container and is, rather, an active, 
self-control behavior in which attention is used to maintain or suppress information (Engle, 
2002). To induce low vs. high ED, we manipulated whether participants had to exert less or 
more self-control, that is hold a small or large amount of information in their working 
memory. To this end we adapted a computation span task (Oberauer, Süß, Schulze, Wilhelm, 
& Wittmann, 2000) to create low- and high-ED versions. All participants had to judge 
whether the result of an equation was true or false. Furthermore, the correct results of each 
equation had to be remembered and entered in the correct order on the keyboard. The two 
conditions differed in the number of equations that had to be completed before the results 
could be entered. Whereas participants in the low-ED condition had to remember the results 
of two equations, participants in the high-ED condition had to remember four to eight 
equations. Participants completed 180 trials in both conditions. 
Measured moderator. The measure of TSC was identical to the one used in Study 1. 
Dependent variables. 
Game of dice task (GDT). The GDT (Brand et al., 2005) is a computerized decision 
task that provides explicit information about the gains and losses associated with given 
choices. Participants were instructed to maximize their fictitious starting capital of 1,000 € 
within 10 rounds of throwing a single die. Before each round, they had to bet either on a 
single number or a combination of two, three, or four numbers. If the die showed a number 
they had chosen (either as a single number or within a combination), they won an amount of 
money (a single number: 1,000 € gain/loss; combination of two numbers: 500 € gain/loss; 
combination of three numbers: 200 € gain/loss; combination of four numbers: 100 € 
gain/loss). If not, they lost the same amount. Thus, betting high amounts of money (500 € or 
1,000 € on a single number) was a riskier option. As each of these choices has a different 
winning probability ranging from 16.6% to 66.6%, it follows that risky decisions are also 
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more disadvantageous. Participants had to make a total of 10 decisions within the game. After 
each throw, the gain or loss was indicated on the screen. The computer also displayed the 
participants’ current money total, as well as the number of remaining rounds. In the GDT, two 
out of the four possible choices are defined as “advantageous” or “not risky” because they 
have a winning probability of 50% or higher. The other two options are referred to as 
“disadvantageous” or “risky” because they have a winning probability of less than 50% and 
result in high losses. The GDT score “risky decisions” is defined as the number of risky 
decisions accrued after 10 rounds. Higher GDT risk scores indicate more risky decisions. 
Reliability was estimated by the Spearman-Brown-corrected correlation between GDT test 
halves (α = .71). 
Achievement motivation. Achievement motivation was measured using a German 
version of the Achievement Motives Scale (AMS; Gjesme & Nygard, 1970; German version: 
Lang & Fries, 2007). The AMS contains five items (e.g., “I like situations in which I can find 
out how capable I am”), and higher achievement motivation is indicated by higher scores 
(scale ranging from 1 to 6).  
Procedure. The study was conducted in the laboratory in group sessions of up to five 
individuals. Upon arrival, participants were seated at individual computer stations where they 
completed the TSC measure followed by the ED task, the AMS, and the GDT. After that, 
participants were debriefed and thanked. 
Results 
Preliminary analyses. All continuous variables were screened for univariate outliers 
(|SD| > 3), but none were found. The two dependent variables were unrelated, but across the 
whole sample higher TSC was related to less achievement motivation and more risky 
decisions (Table 2). To test whether these bivariate relationships were moderated by ED, we 
conducted moderated regression analyses for each dependent variable independently. 
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Risky behavior. A high degree of ED led to more risky decisions, M = 4.62, SD = 1.64, 
than low ED, M = 3.97, SD = 1.09, t(100.72) = 2.59, p < .01, d = .52. The number of risky 
decisions in the dice task was regressed on the experimental manipulation of ED and the 
standardized TSC scale, resulting in a significant amount of explained variance, R2 = .15, F(2, 
124) = 10.50, p < .001. Importantly, adding the cross-product significantly increased the 
explained variance, ∆R2 = .12, p < 001, and the main effects of ED, ß = .22, p < .01, and TSC, 
ß = .26, p < .001, were qualified by their interaction, ß = .35, p < .001. Simple slope analyses 
revealed that the ED manipulation did not lead to an increase in risky decisions for 
participants low in TSC, b = -0.18, SE = 0.15, p = .26 (Figure 3). However, participants high 
in TSC were prone to making significantly more risky decisions after high (vs. low) ED 
induction, b = 0.80, SE = 0.15, p < .001. Thus, a positive relationship between TSC and risky 
behavior was found only under high ED. 
Achievement motivation. As expected, ED led to a decrease in achievement 
motivation. Participants in the high-ED condition had lower AMS scores, M = 4.34, SD = 
0.80, than participants in the low-ED condition, M = 4.69, SD = 0.66, t(114.46) = 2.71, p < 
.01, d = 0.51. Regressing achievement motivation on the effect-coded ED manipulation (-1 
for low ED, +1 for high ED) and the standardized TSC scale revealed a significant outcome, 
R2 = .10, F(2, 124) = 7.21, p < .001. Adding the cross-product of these two predictors 
significantly increased the amount of variance explained, ∆R2 = .08, p < 001. Results showed 
that the main effects of the experimental manipulation, ß = -.23, p < .01, and TSC, ß = -.19, p 
< .05, were qualified by a significant interaction, ß = -.29, p = .001 (Figure 4). Thus, TSC 
moderated the ED effect on achievement motivation in a negative direction. That is, for high-
TSC participants the ED effect was large and significant, b = -0.38, SE = 0.09, p < .001, 
whereas for low-TSC participants the ED manipulation showed no effect, b = 0.04, SE = 0.09, 
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p =.61. Thus, TSC was negatively related to achievement motivation only if participants were 
previously depleted.  
Discussion 
The findings consistently replicated the findings of Study 1 in showing an ironic effect 
of TSC. ED led to an increase in risky decisions but a decrease in achievement motivation. 
However, these effects were more pronounced for high-TSC participants. The replication of 
the ED effect on risk-taking behavior was thus complemented by a previously unexplored – 
and seemingly paradoxical – moderation of this effect. Participants who reported high levels 
of TSC were more risk-prone after ED than low-TSC participants. Furthermore, we have 
demonstrated an effect of ED on (self-reported) achievement motivation. Complementing the 
literature on ED effects on task persistence and task performance, this shows that ED also has 
an effect at an earlier stage of a performance-related behavioral sequence. Importantly, this 
effect was also moderated by TSC such that high-TSC participants showed the lowest 
achievement motivation after ED. The moderation analyses also showed that the unexpected 
zero-order correlations between TSC and the number of risky decisions and achievement 
motivation were entirely driven by the high-ED condition. In the low-ED condition, the 
opposite was apparent (but not different from zero): High TSC was associated with fewer 
risky decisions and more achievement motivation. 
Taken together, the first two studies report an ironic effect of TSC after ED on three 
dependent variables. These findings are difficult to reconcile with the positive view of TSC 
pervasive in the literature. Why did participants who describe themselves as highly self-
controlled in their daily life show more self-control failure in our experimental settings? One 
straight-forward explanation could be based on the suspicion that self-reported levels of TSC 
are simply inaccurate. It may be tempting to accept the low validity of TSC self-reports as an 
explanation of our findings. However, such an argument does not explain why high-TSC 
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participants are indeed better adjusted in everyday life, as can be derived from the association 
of TSC with non self-reported variables like academic achievements (Tangney et al., 2004), 
rule violation (Muraven et al., 2006), or perpetration of partner violence (Finkel, DeWall, 
Slotter, Oaten, & Foshee, 2009). 
As a second explanation, it may be that experimental ED tasks put high-TSC individuals 
in positions that are unknown to them. It has become increasingly accepted in self-control 
research that successful self-control in real life may rely on inherently different strategies than 
the active inhibition of impulsive behavior (Fujita, 2011). Indeed, high-TSC persons seem to 
more frequently use strategies that avoid any encounter with tempting situations. They 
therefore engage less frequently in the effortful inhibition of impulses than low-TSC persons 
(Hofmann, Baumeister, Förster, & Vohs, 2012). Avoiding temptation, a naïve variant of the 
effective behavioral therapeutic technique of stimulus control, is highly effective in everyday 
life as it does not entail the risk of depleting one’s resources while actively inhibiting.  
However, engaging in effortful inhibition of impulses has been shown to be a capacity 
that can be trained. Within the strength model of self-control (Muraven & Baumeister, 2000) 
actively suppressing one’s desires will train the self-control muscle and make it more likely 
that temptation can be actively resisted in the future (Baumeister et al., 1998; Gailliot, 
Baumeister et al., 2007; Muraven, Baumeister, & Tice, 1999; Oaten & Cheng, 2006a, 2006b, 
2007). Ironically, the fact that high-TSC individuals avoid tempting situations means that they 
also hardly engage in active inhibition, potentially resulting in a weaker ability to resist 
temptation once they are forcibly confronted with it. Therefore, we conducted a third study to 
clarify the relationships among TSC, impulse strength, impulse inhibition, and self-regulatory 
success in routine self-regulation behavior.  
Study 3 
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We conducted a cross-sectional study to explore the relationship between TSC and the 
average frequency of impulse inhibition across 16 different domains of routine self-controlled 
behavior. Based on the reasoning outlined above, we expected TSC to be associated with less 
frequent impulse inhibition attempts. To gain a more fine-grained understanding of TSC in 
everyday self-regulation situations, we also assessed perceived desire strengths as well as 
perceived self-regulation success across these domains.  
Method 
Participants. A total of 358 individuals (310 women, 45 men; mean age = 25.16, SD = 
6.91) participated in an online study on daily temptations and how well people could 
overcome their weaker self. Participation was completely voluntary and no compensation was 
offered. 
Everyday self-regulatory behavior. A list of 16 self-control relevant behaviors was 
created and included either short-term temptations that required inhibition (e.g., eating candy, 
drinking alcohol, procrastinating, playing video games) or short-term efforts (e.g., studying, 
being on time, exercise) that needed to be initiated to reach long-term goals like better health, 
academic achievement, and fulfilling social relationships. For each of these domains we 
assessed the strength of temptation by asking, “How difficult is it for you to resist the 
following temptations?” or respectively, “How difficult is it for you to pull yourself together 
to engage in the following activities?” on a continuous slider scale from zero (weak 
temptation/not difficult) to 100 (strong temptation/very difficult). This was followed by our 
main variable of interest: the frequency of self-control efforts. For each of the 16 domains, 
participants indicated on a scale from zero (never) to six (several times a day) how often they 
inhibited an urge to give in to temptation or actively had to overcome their weaker self to 
engage in short-term efforts. Lastly, self-control success was assessed by asking, “How often 
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do you actually succeed in resisting these temptations/carrying out these activities?” on a 
scale from one (never) to seven (always). 
Self-control scales. After reporting these aspects of routine self-regulatory behavior, 
participants completed the same TSC scale as in the previous two studies. In addition, the 
German version (Bertrams & Dickhäuser, 2009) of the well-established SCS (Tangney et al., 
2004) was included to test whether the presumed relation was specific to our TSC scale.  
Results 
All three aspects of everyday self-regulatory behavior proved sufficiently consistent 
across the 16 domains (Table 3). We therefore aggregated across these domains to reach one 
indicator of average temptation strength, average frequency of self-control efforts, and 
average self-control success, respectively. Intercorrelations of these scales revealed that 
stronger temptation required more self-control efforts and that both were negative predictors 
of self-control success (Table 3). More importantly, TSC was related to a lower frequency of 
actually engaging in self-control efforts.
1
 Instead, individual differences in TSC corresponded 
with individual differences in perceived temptation strength. This pattern was identical for the 
TSC scale employed in Studies 1 and 2, as well as the German version of the standard SCS 
(Bertrams & Dickhäuser, 2009). Speaking to the convergent validity of these two scales, they 
were highly intercorrelated. 
Discussion 
As hypothesized, participants who described themselves as highly self-controlled 
effectively engaged in fewer self-control consuming efforts in their everyday life. In fact, 
individual differences in self-reported TSC did not tap into individual differences in the 
ability to inhibit one’s impulses but rather into individual differences in the strength of these 
                                                            
1
 Post-hoc control analyses revealed that this was particularly the case for the frequency of resisting short-term 
temptation and not significantly so for the frequency of investing short-term effort. Full analyses can be obtained 
from the authors. 
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impulses. Whether these desire strengths can actually be accurately introspected or whether 
they are inferred from the fact that few problems arise in these domains is open to debate. 
Importantly, the findings align well with the recent proposal that TSC may operate more by 
way of establishing effective habits and routines than by resisting single temptations (de 
Ridder, Lensvelt-Mulders, Finkenauer, Stok, & Baumeister, 2011). Empirically, a large 
ambulatory experience sampling study also showed that TSC was related to lower desire 
strengths and less active resistance against temptation (Hofmann et al., 2012). Thus, people 
high in TSC seem to avoid temptations in the first place, which also leads them to experience 
less self-control conflict situations in which impulses have to be actively inhibited.  
How does this conceptualization of TSC offer an explanation for our ironic findings? 
Crucially, participants in our Studies 1 and 2were forced to encounter temptations 
independent of whether they avoided such encounters in real life. In that sense, the 
experimental situations might have been less common and more artificial for high-TSC 
participants. Highly self-controlled participants who are used to avoiding exposure to 
tempting sweets in real life were seated in front of a bowl of chocolate after completing a 
depleting task. Actively inhibiting the impulse to eat candy is something they may have been 
less used to do in their routine activities and they may have lacked the everyday training to 
successfully inhibit it. This process assumption could be supported in future work by 
demonstrating that high-TSC individuals experience themselves as less able to cope with 
tempting situations. An alternative view could be based on the reasoning that resisting one’s 
impulses is more central to the self-concept of high-TSC individuals. Thus, ED manipulations 
tax them in a twofold sense: The manipulations deplete cognitive resources (as they do for 
everybody), but additionally evoke fear about self-control failure and thus potentially further 
deplete resources needed to resist temptations. This reasoning could receive support from 
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future data showing greater feelings of fatigue and exhaustion in high-TSC individuals after 
ED.
2
 
General Discussion 
In two studies, we have provided empirical support for our argument that dispositional 
TSC exposes individuals to the danger of self-regulation failures after situational ED. We 
found this effect utilizing two different ED manipulations (i.e., modified Stroop task, working 
memory capacity task) for three different dependent variables, including such self-regulation 
relevant domains as appetitive/impulsive behavior (i.e., candy consumption, risky behavior) 
and performance-related behavior (i.e., achievement motivation). This ironic effect of TSC 
after ED has not been explored previously. In fact, little attention has been paid to the 
interplay of trait and state self-control, and the existing empirical evidence is mixed (Hagger 
et al., 2010). In trying to understand this puzzling effect we explored the relationship between 
TSC and relevant everyday self-regulation behavior. In line with more recent 
conceptualizations of TSC, our results corroborate that the view of high TSC as the frequent 
active inhibition of acute strong impulses needs to be corrected to reflect that high-TSC 
individuals rather seem to actively avoid tempting situations. Our lab-based exposure to 
tempting cues might thus have been more unusual for them, as they were confronted with 
self-control conflicts they had less experience resisting.  
It should be noted that our findings are at odds with previously published studies that 
showed a buffering effect of TSC on ED. Trying to make sense of these inconsistencies, it 
should be noted that our studies bear some advantages over previous studies. First, we have 
shown an effect on different behavioral variables, candy consumption and risk-taking 
behavior. Second, both our ED manipulations were content-free tasks that could not be 
resisted by merely suppressing the evoked content (as opposed to mortality salience 
                                                            
2
 We are grateful to an anonymous reviewer for providing a helpful comment regarding future studies. 
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manipulations). Also, modified Stroop tasks are a well-established ED manipulation (average 
meta-analytic effect size d = .40; Hagger et al., 2010). Finally, although our scale cannot be 
called a standard scale, its operationalization relied on common definitions of self-control and 
it showed high convergence with the standard SCS scale (Bertrams & Dickhäuser, 2009) as it 
was empirically derived from standard scales assessing self-control related traits (Schmidt & 
Imhoff, 2011).  
Despite an apparently provocative contradiction against the positive view on TSC 
implied in the strength model of self-control, our results are in principle reconcilable with it 
under specific assumptions. As an example, a prominent conceptualization of TSC has 
emphasized that individuals who are good at self-control know how to use their scarce self-
regulatory resources in highly efficient ways, as captured in the descriptive term conservation 
hypothesis (Muraven, Shmueli, & Burkley, 2006). If this reasoning is adopted, then it would 
be inferred that high-TSC individuals appeared more vulnerable to ED manipulations because 
they did not waste much effort towards self-control in these conditions, wanting instead to 
save their scarce self-control resources for later. The fact that in Study 2 greater vulnerability 
of high-TSC individuals was found not only in the first (i.e., achievement motivation) but also 
in a second dependent variable (i.e., risky behavior) may be taken as a preliminary indication 
against this explanation. To defend the conservation hypothesis one would need to 
hypothesize that participants were saving their resorurces for tasks outside of the laboratory 
situation. Although this may be a legitimate argument, it clearly points to epistemological 
pitfalls of such auxiliary assumptions. Accepting this possibility makes it impossible to falsify 
the protective account of TSC: If high TSC individuals do better after ED, they are protected 
by TSC. If they do worse, they are just saving their scarce resources for more relevant 
situations. Thus, allowing to make these additional assumptions about conservation would 
make the whole model immune to empirical contradictions. 
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Ironically, the strength model also allows for a diametrically opposed explanation in 
dual-task paradigms. Individuals high in TSC could have spent more effort in the initial ED 
tasks, thus wasting their scarce self-control resources on the irrelevant task (anti-conservation 
hypothesis). We conducted control analyses to test for this alternative explanation. However, 
average response latency and error rates in the Stroop (Study 1) or working memory capacity 
task (Study 2) were not related to TSC or the dependent variables in either the low-ED, |r| < 
.18, p > .14, or the high-ED condition, |r| < .16, p > .22. Thus, exhaustion of high-TSC 
individuals in the ED-inducing first task can be ruled out as an explanation for the effects. 
On a more conceptual level, future research should elucidate under which conditions 
TSC has protective vs. detrimental effects on self-control in dual-task paradigms. We 
reasoned that the greater vulnerability of high-TSC participants was attributable to the fact 
that their routine regulation strategies (e.g., stimulus control) became futile when they were 
confronted with situations they otherwise would have avoided and consequently had little 
experience with. However, tempting situations cannot only be avoided physically, but also 
psychologically. If individuals decide beforehand that they will not become engaged with the 
tempting stimulus, their likelihood of resisting should increase. An example of such 
psychological stimulus control could be seen in implementation intentions (Gollwitzer & 
Brandstaetter, 1997). Implementation intentions describe a self-regulatory strategy linking a 
rather abstract intended goal (“I want to achieve goal x”) to very concrete, goal-directed 
behaviors (“I intend to (not) do y when situation z is encountered in order to achieve goal x”).  
Empirically, implementation intentions served as a protective factor against ED effects (Webb 
& Sheeran, 2003). As it is highly plausible that high-TSC individuals more frequently rely on 
implementation intentions, the effect of TSC on ED effects might be moderated by whether 
they have a chance to develop such intentions a priori or not. Future research could 
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manipulate whether participants are offered the opportunity or even actively encouraged to 
form such intentions (a priori information about the temptation to follow) or not. 
Another aspect future research might elucidate is the different role of TSC in either 
resisting temptations to reach long-term goals or initiating (unpleasant) short-term effort to 
reach long-term goals (recently labeled stop and start control; de Boer, van Hooft, & Bakker, 
2011). All our dependent measures were instances of stop control, requiring the necessity to 
overcome temptations. Thus, the backfiring effect of TSC might only be existent for such 
instances but not if an initiation of effort is required (e.g., an anagram task). In relation to our 
proposed explanation it might very well be that people high in TSC have less routine in stop 
control (as they avoid tempting situations) but more experience in start control (e.g., initiating 
such planful avoidance). In line with such an interpretation, both TSC scales were negatively 
related to the frequency of resisting short-term temptation but not investing short-term effort 
in Study 3. Future research might directly address this differentiation. 
That said, we caution against the premature characterization of TSC as increasing the 
vulnerability for self-control failure in dual-task paradigms per se. As argued above, the ironic 
effect we found might be due to the fact that the highly efficient stimulus-control strategy of 
high-TSC individuals to avoid tempting situations in the first place is blocked in experimental 
ED studies. Thus, our findings clearly do not invalidate the plethora of general findings 
providing support for positive effects of TSC (Baumeister & Alquist, 2009; Tangney et al., 
2004). However, it may be that the highly efficient avoidance of tempting situations that 
characterizes successful self-control attempts does not come without costs. When 
encountering commonly avoided temptations, high-TSC individuals may ironically be 
particularly bad at resisting these temptations and thus more vulnerable to situation-specific 
self-control failure.     
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Table 1 
Descriptive statistics, internal consistency, and zero-order correlations of all continuous 
variables in Study 1. 
Variable α M SD 1. 2. 
1. Candy Consumption - 20.55 3.24   
2. Trait Self-Control (TSC) .85 3.20 0.74 .45**  
3. Restrained Eating (RE) .88 3.40 1.54 .20* .29** 
Note. N = 137. Candy consumption in grams, TSC on a scale from 1 to 5, and RE on a scale 
from 1 to 7. 
** p < .01, * p < .05 
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Table 2 
Descriptive statistics, internal consistency, and zero-order correlations of all continuous 
variables in Study 2. 
Variable α M SD 1. 2. 
1. Achievement Motivation .88 4.53 0.75   
2. Risky Decisions .71 4.28 1.41 -.14  
3. Trait Self-Control (TSC) .84 3.17 0.69 -.23* .31** 
Note. N = 127. Achievement motivation on a scale from 1 to 6, risky decisions between 0 and 
10, and TSC on a scale from 1 to 5. 
** p < .01, * p < .05 
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Table 3   
Descriptive statistics, internal consistency, and zero-order correlations of all continuous variables in Study 3. 
Variable α M SD 1. 2. 3. 4. 
1. Average Strength of Temptation .63 45.93 11.21     
2. Average Frequency of Self-Control Efforts .71 2.56 0.57 .32**    
3. Average Self-Control Success .73 4.82 0.76 -.60** -.19**   
4. Trait Self-Control (TSC) .86 3.18 0.79 -.57** -.19** .50**  
5. Self-Control Scale (SCS) .86 2.79 0.71 -.67** -.33** .49** .72** 
Note. N = 358. Average temptation strength from 0 to 100, average frequency of self-control efforts from 0 to 6, average self-
control success from 0 to 7, and TSC and SCS on a scale from 1 to 5. 
** p < .01, * p < .05   
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Figure captions 
Figure 1. Candy consumption (in grams) as a function of ego depletion and habitual 
restrained eating in Study 1. 
Figure 2. Candy consumption (in grams) as a function of ego depletion and trait self-control 
in Study 1. 
Figure 3. Number of risky decisions in a game of dice task as a function of ego depletion and 
trait self-control in Study 2. 
Figure 4. Achievement motivation (hope for success) as a function of ego depletion and trait 
self-control in Study 2. 
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Figure 1 
Ego Depletion Manipulation
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Figure 2 
Ego Depletion Manipulation
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Figure 3 
Ego Depletion Manipulation
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Figure 4 
Ego Depletion Manipulation
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Appendix 
SRSQ self-control scale 
Item # Item wording Source 
1. I finish what I start. UPPS 
2. I usually think carefully before doing anything. UPPS 
3. I’m pretty good about pacing myself so as to get things done on time. UPPS 
4. Before I start to tackle a new task, I usually make a plan. VCI-S3 
5. People would say that I have iron self-discipline. SCS 
6. If a task needs to be completed, I prefer to tackle it immediately. VCI-S3 
7. People can count on me to keep on schedule. SCS 
8. I am a productive person who always gets the job done. UPPS 
9. I keep everything neat. SCS 
10. When something needs to be done, I prefer to begin at once. VCI-S3 
Note. Source indicates original item source. Items from SCS and UPPS were translated into German. 
SCS = Self-Control Scale (Tangney, Baumeister, & Boone, 2004)  
UPPS = UPPS Impulsive Behavior Scale (Whiteside & Lynam, 2001)  
VCI-S3 = Volitional Components Inventory (Kuhl & Fuhrmann, 1998) 
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